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A History of Western Philosophy, and its Connection with political and social Circumstances from the earliest Times to the present Day. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Pp. xxiii, 895. Simon and Schuster. New York.

Even if I possessed (which I do not) the requisite knowledge of the various philosophers treated by Lord Russell and of the general historical background which he describes, it would be quite impossible to give in a reasonably short space a detailed criticism of this immensely long book. I shall confine myself to the following two points. I shall give a brief sketch of the ground covered, and then I shall give an account of the plan which Lord Russell says that he had in mind in writing the book and an estimate of his success in carrying out that plan.

(1) *The ground covered.* The book begins with a short Introduction, in which the author gives a preliminary account of what he means by "philosophy," followed by a sketch of European history from 600 B.C. to the present day. This ends with the statement that social cohesion is a necessity, that it has never yet been maintained by merely rational arguments, and that it remains to be seen whether there can be a social order not based on irrational dogma and not involving more than the irreducible minimum of constraints on the individual. The latter is the ideal of liberalism.

This is followed by a chapter on the rise of Greek civilization. Then come chapters on the Milesian School, on Pythagoras, on Heraklitus, on Parmenides, and on Empedocles. Great importance is attached to Pythagoras as the first to introduce a mixture of mathematics and mysticism into European thought. Parmenides is said to be the first to base metaphysical principles on the logical analysis of propositions. Russell ascribes the beginnings of the notion of persistent substances to attempts to answer Heraklitus without going to the extreme advocated by Parmenides.

A short chapter on Athens in relation to culture intervenes between those just mentioned and chapters on Anaxagoras, on the Atomists, and on Protagoras. Russell thinks that Greek philosophy begins to deteriorate after Democritus by becoming too anthropocentric.

So we pass to a chapter on Socrates, of whom Russell remarks later in the book: "As a man we may believe him admitted to the communion of saints; but as a philosopher he needs a long residence in a scientific purgatory." It is alleged that there is "... something smug and unctuous about him, which reminds one of a bad type of cleric." (I am tempted to adapt the retort which Lincoln made to the persons who told him that General Grant drank too much whisky.)

After a chapter on the influence of Sparta and of myths about Sparta, a city which Lord Russell dislikes, come six chapters on various aspects of the philosophy of Plato, a person whom he dislikes still more. The antipathy seems to be based primarily on political grounds, and secondarily (I suspect), on annoyance with the almost uninterrupted stream of praise which Plato has received from scholars throughout the ages. The chapters in question deal in turn with the sources of Plato's opinions, with his Utopia, with his theory of Ideas, with his theory of Immortality, with his Cosmogony, and with his Theory of Knowledge. Among the *ober dicta* I may mention the statement that "Plato was hardly ever intellectually honest" (p. 78). After this one is a little surprised to find the statement on p. 127 that the *Parmenides*

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"contains one of the most remarkable cases in history of self-criticism by a philosopher." I suppose this must have been one of Plato's rare lapses into intellectual honesty.

There follow five chapters on various topics in Aristotle's philosophy. Lord Russell dislikes Aristotle if possible more than Plato, but for different reasons. For Plato he has a kind of reluctant admiration; for Aristotle, as revealed in his *Ethics*, and his *Politics*, he has a hearty contempt. "To a man with any depth of feeling it" (the *Nicomachean Ethics*) "cannot but be repulsive" (p. 173). "I do not agree with Plato" (on the state) "but, if anything could make me do so, it would be Aristotle's arguments against him" (p. 189). Apart from these emotional antipathies, Russell's main objection to Aristotle is that certain of his logical and metaphysical theories, which Russell regards as false or inadequate, had a harmful influence on logic and metaphysics when Aristotle was made into a kind of philosophical Pope by St. Thomas. The topics treated in these five chapters are Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, his *Ethics*, his *Politics*, his *Logic*, and his *Physics*.

The next chapter deals with early Greek Mathematics and Astronomy. It pays a high tribute to the intellectual greatness of Euclid's *Elements*; and it asserts that the merit of the Copernican hypothesis (originally suggested by Aristarchus of Samos), as compared with the theory of epicycles developed by Hipparchus and perfected by Ptolemy, was not its *truth* but its greater simplicity. (This of course presupposes that the relational theory of motion can be accepted as completely satisfactory.)

There follows a purely historical chapter on the Hellenistic world, which forms an introduction to chapters on Cynics and Sceptics, on the Epicureans, and on Stoicism. As regards Epicureanism, Russell remarks that it was "a valetudinarian philosophy, designed to suit a world in which adventurous happiness had become scarcely possible." There are some good remarks on the ethical doctrines of the Stoics. "There is . . . an element of sour grapes in Stoicism. We can't be happy, but we can be good; let us therefore pretend that, so long as we are good, it doesn't matter being unhappy." (p. 269). Again, Russell points out that, since modern drugs and modern methods of "third degree," as practised by the late German and the present Russian government, can reduce any man to docility, "the will is . . . only independent of the tyrant so long as the tyrant is unscientific."

Between the last of these chapters and one on Plotinus, which concludes the account of Ancient Philosophy, comes a purely historical chapter on the Roman Empire in relation to Culture. Russell likes Plotinus and gives a very sympathetic account of his philosophy. "Among men who have been unhappy in a mundane sense, but resolutely determined to find a higher happiness in the world of theory, Plotinus holds a very high place . . . Like Spinoza, he has a certain kind of moral purity which is very impressive." I think it ought to strike Russell as odd that a man like Plotinus, who was steeped in Plato's works, should have had such a reverence for Plato if the latter were what Russell represents him as being.

The second Book is concerned with what Russell calls "Catholic Philosophy," i.e., philosophy in the period between St. Augustine and the Renaissance. It is largely concerned with general history of Europe. The first chapter deals with the religious development of the Jews; the second with Christianity during the first four centuries after Christ; and the third with three great Doctors of the Western Church, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, and St. Augustine. "Few men," says Russell, "have surpassed these three in influence on the course of history" (p. 335). The fourth chapter is devoted to a detailed account of St. Augustine's

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theology and philosophy. Russell rates St. Augustine very high as a pure philosopher. Though he disagrees with St. Augustine's theory of time, which is in essence that time is subjective and therefore depends on created beings, he considers it to be a brilliant philosophical achievement. He points out that St. Augustine anticipated both Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* and his answer to Gassendi's alternative argument *Ambulo ergo sum*. Russell gives an interesting summary of the argument of *The City of God*. He says that both St. Augustine and Karl Marx took over the Jewish theory of world-history, past and future. The former adapted it to Christianity, and the latter to Socialism. Russell provides an amusing dictionary of equivalents between the main categories of Jewish and Communist eschatology.

Next come three chapters which are mainly devoted to general history. The first of these describes the main events and personalities of the fifth and sixth centuries. The most important philosophic figure is Boethius, of whom Lord Russell says "he would have been remarkable in any age, in the age in which he lived he is utterly amazing" (p. 373). The next chapter is devoted to Saint Benedict and Gregory the Great, and the next to the Papacy in the Dark Ages. Lord Russell thinks that civilization in Western Europe reached its nadir about A.D. 1,000, and that from that time there began an upward movement which lasted until 1914. But he points out that it is easy for us to over-estimate the importance of Western Europe, and that during our dark ages there flourished the brilliant T'ang dynasty in China and the brilliant Islamic civilization. He describes the work of the chief Islamic philosophers in a later chapter on Mohammedan culture and philosophy. He will not admit that the Arabs were original thinkers, except in mathematics and chemistry. The most that he will allow to them (and to the Byzantines) is that they "preserved the apparatus of civilization" while the West was still barbarous.

The chapter on Benedict and Gregory is followed by one about the life and philosophy of the Irish scholar John Eriugena. Then follow a chapter on Ecclesiastical Reform in the eleventh century and the chapter already mentioned on Mohammedan culture. This brings us to one on the twelfth century and the beginnings of Scholasticism, which contains an account of Abelard and St. Bernard. The next deals with the thirteenth century, which Lord Russell regards as the culmination of the Middle Ages. He describes Innocent III as "the first *great* Pope in whom there was no element of sanctity" (p. 443); he remarks that the Church was saved in this century from the fate which befell it in the sixteenth largely by the mendicant orders founded by St. Francis and St. Dominic; and he reflects that "if Satan existed the future of the order founded by St. Francis would afford him the most exquisite gratification." (p. 450).

The decks are now cleared for a chapter on St. Thomas Aquinas, who is described as "a special pleader" (p. 463), and whose temperament is said to have been "ratiocinative rather than mystical" (p. 460). His doctrines are expounded and criticized in a thoroughly unsympathetic and external way. It is certain that St. Thomas had mystical experiences and that he attached immense importance to them. A philosopher who defended (as St. Thomas does in his tract *De Aeternitate Mundi*) on philosophic grounds the possibility that the world has no beginning in time against those who claimed to disprove it, although he held on the basis of the scriptures that this possibility is contrary to fact, is a good deal more than a special pleader.

The next chapter describes the views of the great Franciscan schoolmen, Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam. Lord Russell thinks that

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Roger Bacon, who was "encyclopaedic . . . but unsystematic" and who quoted a wealth of authorities in support of his opinion that one should not rely on authority, has been much over-rated in modern times. He regards William of Occam as the greatest scholastic after St. Thomas and as the last of the great scholastics, and he gives a critical account of Occam's views in metaphysics (where he was *not* a nominalist) and in logic (where he *was* one).

This book ends with a chapter on the Eclipse of the Papacy, and one has a feeling that Lord Russell must have breathed a sigh of relief to be at last out of the enchanted wood of the Middle Ages, in which both by temperament and training he is (to quote Housman) "a stranger and afraid, in a world he never made."

Book III, which treats of Modern Philosophy, is divided into two parts. The first covers the period from the Renaissance up to and including Hume; the second that from Hume to the present day. It opens with a chapter on the general characteristics of the whole period. Lord Russell thinks that modern philosophy has been in the main *subjective*, and that the "extreme of subjectivism is a form of madness." (p. 494). Plain men have become more and more influenced and impressed by the success of science as a *practical technique*, but philosophers have only lately been influenced by this aspect of it and have so far mainly considered science as a theoretical doctrine and method. The success of science as a technique, dependent on a closely-knit social organization, has led to a feeling of unlimited power coupled with a loss of all sense of direction. "It assures men that they can perform wonders, but does not tell them what wonders to perform . . . Ends are no longer considered, only the skilfulness of the process is valued. This also is a form of madness" (p. 494).

The second chapter deals with the Italian Renaissance. It raises the question: "How much murder and anarchy are we prepared to endure for the sake of great achievements, such as those of the Renaissance?"; and answers: "In the past a good deal, in our own times much less"; but realizes that there is an unsolved problem here.

The third chapter contains a fair and sympathetic account of Machiavelli and his political theories. "The world has become more like that of Machiavelli than it was, and the modern man who hopes to refute his philosophy must think more deeply than seemed necessary in the nineteenth century" (p. 511).

The next three chapters deal respectively with Erasmus and More, the Reformation and the Counter-reformation, and the Rise of Science. The first of these contains an account of More's Utopia, which concludes with a remark on the "intolerable dullness" which Lord Russell thinks would characterize life in it or in any other planned society, real or imaginary (p. 522).

At the beginning of the chapter on the Rise of Modern Science Lord Russell says that "the modern world, so far as mental outlook is concerned, begins in the seventeenth century." The first changes were the ejection of animism from natural science; the rejection of the notion that man is the centre of the universe and that teleological explanations are in place in science; and, notwithstanding this, a growth of human pride in human achievements. Later changes were the rejection of the notion of force as the cause of motion and the abandonment of the absolute theory of space, time, and motion.

The seventh chapter is concerned with Francis Bacon, who is described as "morally . . . an average man, no better and no worse than the bulk of his contemporaries" (p. 542). In discussing Bacon's logic of induction Lord Russell says that the evidence for *ultimate* generalizations remains induction by simple enumeration, and that for this no satisfactory defence exists.

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I think that this opinion (whether it be correct or incorrect) tends to make Russell unappreciative of Bacon's great merit as the first person who saw and emphasized the importance of negative instances and exclusion in scientific reasoning.

The next chapter treats of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. Russell remarks that on the whole the power of the state has grown since Hobbes's time even more than Hobbes would have desired. It is true that the state is the only alternative to anarchy; but there are other evils to be guarded against, e.g., the injustice and the ossification which inevitably follow if the government is omnipotent and need fear no resistance. Nevertheless "Hobbes is the first really modern writer on political theory. Where he is wrong it is from over-simplification" (p. 556). He needs to be supplemented by a theory of conflicts between classes within each state, and a theory of international relations.

The next three chapters treat in order the three great Continental philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who occupy the period from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century. Lord Russell is temperamentally very sympathetic to Spinoza and very antipathetic to Leibniz, whilst he does not seem to have any strong emotional reaction towards Descartes. The consequence is that, when the moral characters of these philosophers come under review, Leibniz is extravagantly condemned, Spinoza as extravagantly praised, and Descartes judged with fairness and common-sense.

Russell remarks that "although Spinoza's whole philosophy is dominated by the idea of God, the orthodox accused him of atheism" (p. 569). It seems to me that the orthodox were perfectly correct. The whole of Spinoza's writings are indeed filled with the word "God," and I have no doubt that Spinoza quite honestly felt towards the object which he called by that name emotions something like those which genuine theists feel towards God in the ordinary sense. But, if we look behind venerable names and edifying phrases used in extremely Pickwickian senses and if we discount the emotions which they are liable to call up through association, I think we shall find that Spinoza's system is a form of atheism which any theist who is not completely muddle-headed must reject without hesitation.

Lord Russell regards the greater part of Spinoza's metaphysics as false or groundless; has a great admiration for his ethical attitude and maxims; and therefore discusses carefully how far the latter can be logically separated from the former and how far they can be accepted on their own merits.

Leibniz is admitted by Lord Russell to be "one of the supreme intellects of all time," but it is alleged that "as a human being he was not admirable" (p. 581). He is asserted to have "lied about the extent of his personal acquaintance with Spinoza (p. 569), and to have had an esoteric system which he developed in his correspondence with Arnauld and suppressed for discreditable reasons. No adequate evidence is produced to enable one to test the first accusation, and the second appears to me to be a mare's nest. He is said to have been "somewhat mean about money," on the ground that, when any young lady at the Hanoverian court married, he used to give her a wedding-present consisting of useful maxims, ending with the advice not to give up washing now that she had secured a husband. As weddings among young ladies-in-waiting must have been pretty frequent, and as Leibniz's salary as librarian was probably quite small and there is no reason to think that he had substantial private means, the conclusion derives little support from the premisses. The advice may not have been tactful, but no one who has read in contemporary memoirs about the personal habits of ladies of rank and fashion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can call it superfluous.

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When Lord Russell has exhausted these trivialities he gets down to a serious and valuable examination of Leibniz's philosophic doctrines. He thinks that the classical arguments for the existence of God have been better stated by Leibniz than by any other philosopher, and so he examines them carefully in this place.

A chapter on Philosophical Liberalism follows, and this leads on to three chapters on Locke, one on his Theory of Knowledge, a second on his Political Philosophy, and a third on his Influence. From the general chapter I will quote the following remark: "A philosophy developed in a politically and economically advanced country, where it is little more than a clarification . . . of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere a source of revolutionary ardour and even of actual revolution" (p. 601). Lord Russell considers that Locke's philosophy illustrates the fact that "the most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies, but for that reason have been partially true" (p. 613).

Chapter Sixteen is devoted to Berkeley. It begins badly by misquoting Ronald Knox's celebrated limerick, and stating that Berkeley "in later life abandoned philosophy for tar-water," as if that exhausted the subject-matter of the *Siris*. After that Lord Russell gets down to business and seriously discusses a part (though only a part) of Berkeley's doctrine, viz., the contents of the first and the beginning of the second of the *Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*. What comes later he dismisses as "of minor importance" (p. 648). The discussion is elaborate and interesting, and Lord Russell formulates some of his own views in the course of it.

The next chapter is concerned with the doctrines of Book I of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*. The result of Lord Russell's examination of Hume's arguments about causation is this. He thinks that they prove that *either* science is impossible *or* induction rests on an independent logical principle which is incapable of being inferred either from experience or from other logical principles. This, he holds, makes a serious hole in pure empiricism. (Lord Russell has never accepted the fashionable and comfortable view that the "problem" of the justification of induction is a pseudo-problem to be *resolved* and not a problem to be *solved*). He remarks that "the growth of unreason throughout the nineteenth century is a natural sequel to Hume's destruction of empiricism" (p. 673). This may be true if it means only that a consistent Humean would have no ground for preferring procedures which are commonly counted as "rational" to others which are commonly counted as "irrational." But I should think that it is certainly false if it is intended as a statement about the actual causation of a prevalent attitude of mind.

The chapter on Hume concludes Part I of Book III. The second part is largely concerned with what Lord Russell calls the "Romantic Movement" and its developments in philosophy and politics down to the present day. It opens with a general account of that movement. Lord Russell holds that it set out to free the individual from social restrictions, many of which were antiquated and oppressive. But it was difficult to keep such a movement from developing into a pretext for excesses of anti-social egoism.

The next chapter deals with Rousseau and his contributions to theology and political theory. I must confess that I share the dislike which Lord Russell obviously feels for the personality and the theories of Rousseau. I heartily agree with Russell's remark that "the rejection of reason in favour of the heart" (in theology) "was not an advance. . . . No-one thought of this device so long as reason appeared to be on the side of religious belief. . . . If I had to choose between St. Thomas and Rousseau I should unhesitatingly choose the saint" (p. 693-94).

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The chapter on Kant, which follows, seems to me to be the worst in the book. It is inadequate and inaccurate. The only part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which is seriously considered is the doctrine of space and time in the *Aesthetic*. I should have thought it obvious that far the most important and original part of the first Critique is the *Analytic*, which is not touched upon. It is stated on p. 711 that Kant "gives as an illustration of the working of the categorical imperative that it is wrong to borrow money, because, if we all tried to do so, there would be no money left to borrow." To the best of my belief Kant did not hold that it is wrong to borrow money, and never used the absurd argument ascribed to him above. Lord Russell must have been embroidering on a vague memory of an argument by which Kant tries to prove that it is wrong to borrow money on promise of repayment which one knows one will not be able to make. The plain fact is that Lord Russell thinks, rightly or wrongly, that Kant is not a great philosopher and that his influence has been unfortunate, and that he feels himself dispensed from taking the trouble to expound him adequately and accurately. I am sure that Kant was a great philosopher; but that is neither here nor there. What I complain of is that no-one whose knowledge of Kant was confined to this chapter would be able to understand why Kant has been *thought* by many highly competent persons to be one of the greatest of European philosophers.

Between the chapter on Kant and that on Hegel is sandwiched one on Currents of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. It is argued that the conviction that man is continuous with the irrational animals has raised difficulties for the egalitarians, and that the growth of industrialism and machinery has intoxicated certain men with a sense of power over nature and over other men whom they can use as raw material for propaganda.

Two chapters deal with developments of different aspects of Kant's philosophy by Hegel and by Schopenhauer. The chapter on Hegel contains a clear, and it seems to me a fair, critical account of his main views. In the chapter on Schopenhauer Lord Russell ascribes to him the opinion that the cosmic will is *wicked*. I should have thought that *stupid* would have been a more correct description of it on Schopenhauer's view.

The reader may be surprised to find a chapter on Lord Byron between the two last mentioned. Lord Russell introduces it on the ground that "among those whose importance is greater than it seemed Byron deserves a high place" as the typical "aristocratic rebel" who eventually influences large sections of society which are by no means aristocratic. Byron has of course always been treated much more seriously on the Continent than in England. The chapter has some acute psychological reflexions and makes very good reading.

This is followed by a chapter on Nietzsche, which seems to me to be admirable. Naturally Lord Russell dislikes him and nearly all that he stood for. But this does not prevent him from treating Nietzsche's views with fairness and comprehension. He admits that Nietzsche admired the capacity to *endure*, as well as to inflict, pain; that he did not worship the state, but the *heroic individual*; that he was *not* a nationalist, and in particular was no great admirer of the *German* nation; and that he was not in principle anti-semitic, though he thought (and who shall say him nay?) that Germany had as many Jews as it could comfortably digest. He admits further that "Nietzsche's prophecies have, so far, proved more nearly right than those of liberals or socialists" (pp. 766-67). Lord Russell says that he would like to refute Nietzsche's ethics, which is profoundly distasteful to him, and this leads to an interesting general discussion of the senses in which an ethical system is open to refutation. The chapter concludes with an imaginary argument between Nietzsche and

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Buddha before the judgment-seat of God, in which Russell puts into Buddhas mouth some sentiments which I think that he, as a convinced and radical pessimist, would have unhesitatingly repudiated as pills to cure an earthquake.

A chapter follows, by way of extreme contrast, on the Utilitarians in general and in particular on Bentham and the dark Satanic Mills (James and John Stuart). Lord Russell says that in Bentham's system "belief in equality is deduced from the calculus of pleasures and pains" (p. 776). This is surely a mistake. Bentham asserted the principle "Everyone to count for one and no-one for more than one" as an axiom; he did not profess to prove that a distribution in accordance with this principle would have greater "fecundity" than distribution in accordance with any other, and recommend the principle on that ground.

The next chapter is concerned with Karl Marx. Russell distinguishes three strands in him. He was a successor of the Philosophical Radicals in opposition to romanticism, a reviver of a certain form of materialism, and a system-builder in the Hegelian tradition. (I think we might add that he shared the taste of his race for apocalypses.) In discussing Marx, Russell explains to what extent he himself does and does not accept the "materialist conception of history" as applied to the origin of philosophical theories. He thinks that Marx's main defects as a philosopher were that he was too anthropocentric and that he believed in a universal law of progress.

There follows a very curious chapter on Bergson. It consists mainly of a reprint of an article which Russell published in the *Monist* in 1912. Now it so happens that the main criticisms on Bergson in that article are based on distinctions (e.g., that between act of cognizing and object cognized) which Russell has long since rejected and which he praises Wm. James in the next chapter for having taught him to reject. Certainly Jupiter sometimes nods!

In the chapter on Wm. James, Lord Russell accepts and welcomes the doctrine of the essay *Does Consciousness Exist?* though he gives reasons why the "neutral stuff" should not be described as "consciousness." But he severely criticizes both the transitional doctrine of *The Will to Believe* and the full-blown pragmatic notion of truth to which it was a half-way house.

This brings us to Professor Dewey, who has the great distinction of being the only living philosopher to whom Lord Russell devotes a chapter. Russell thinks that Dewey's most important contribution to philosophy is his instrumental theory of truth. He states and criticizes this, and in doing so gives a brief sketch of his own present view of the nature of truth. He insists that the instrumental theory is one more instance of the defect of anthropocentrism which he has pointed out in so many of the more modern philosophers, "a further step . . . on the road to a certain kind of madness" (p. 828).

The book ends with a short chapter on the Philosophy of Logical Analysis, a subject to which Lord Russell has himself made more important contributions than any one other living writer.

(2) *The Plan of the Book*. The professed object of the book is "to exhibit philosophy . . . as both an effect and a cause of the character of the various communities in which different systems flourished" (p. ix). In accordance with this plan Lord Russell devotes much space to general history in order to display the social and political background of the philosophers whom he discusses. He remarks that, "when an intelligent man expresses a view which seems to us obviously absurd . . . we should try to understand how it ever came to *seem* true. This . . . enlarges the scope of our thinking and helps us to realize how foolish many of our own cherished prejudices will seem to an age which has a different temper of mind" (p. 39). These general considerations are developed

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in rather more detail in the passages in which Lord Russell discusses the "materialist conception of history" as applied to philosophical theories. His view may be summarized as follows. What is called "philosophy" consists of two different elements, viz., (i) questions which are scientific or logical and can be dealt with by methods on which all competent experts are agreed, and (ii) questions of very great practical interest, e.g., human survival of bodily death, where there is no conclusive evidence either way and no real prospect of getting any, but where it is very hard to remain sceptically detached. To the first class of questions social causation is almost irrelevant, to the second it is highly relevant. The prevalent opinions of any age and country on questions of the second kind do tend to reflect certain presuppositions which are embodied in its social and political institutions. But even here *political*, as well as economic, circumstances must be taken into account; and the former cannot be reduced to the latter. A vitally important motive in human affairs is the desire to get, to keep, and to exercise *power over others*. Although wealth is one source of power, it is not the only one; and although power is a necessary condition for acquiring or preserving wealth, it is not desired only as a means to those ends.

How far does Lord Russell keep to his plan? One would expect two things. (1) That the views of each philosopher on questions which are "logical or scientific" would be discussed without reference to his social and political background, but with due allowance for the developments of logical, mathematical, and scientific technique since his time. On the whole this is what Lord Russell does, though I think he makes quite insufficient allowances, particularly in the cases of Plato and Aristotle. (2) That each philosopher's other views would be interpreted and criticized sympathetically with explicit reference to his social and political background, and that a serious attempt would be made to enable the reader to understand how his opinions "ever came to *seem* true." Here it seems to me that Lord Russell has seldom succeeded and has often not seriously tried. Sometimes the temptation to "score off" an ancient or mediaeval thinker by appealing to the tacitly assumed and uncriticized liberal-democratic prejudices of contemporary England and America has proved too strong for Lord Russell's historical conscience. I have the impression that the parts of the book which deal with general history and the parts which deal with the views of particular thinkers lie side-by-side or in successive layers and are not inter-connected in the intimate way which the plan demands.

I think that the almost complete lack of references is a serious defect in the book, though I can see that their presence would have greatly enlarged a volume which is already extremely bulky. The fact is that Lord Russell makes a number of very startling statements and a still greater number of innuendos; that we are provided with no means of checking these, of discovering their context, or of estimating the value of the authorities from whose writings they are drawn; and that the few cases (e.g., the account of Kant's philosophy) which I can check do not encourage me to accept with implicit confidence the very many which I cannot.

C. D. BROAD.

On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative Government. By J. S. MILL, ed. with an introduction by R. B. McCallum (Blackwell, Oxford, 1946. Pp. lix. + 324. Price 8s. 6d.)

It is very desirable that attention should at this time again be called to what is the classical, or at least by far the best-known, exposition of the